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BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 900288-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal is made pursuant to an order entered by the Supreme Court of Utah 
on January 5, 1993.1 This court had original appellate jurisdiction in this case 
pursuant to Title 78, part 2a, Section 3(2) of the Utah Code (1953 as amended). The 
supreme court remanded this case for further proceedings consistent with that original 
appellate jurisdiction. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal ordered by the Supreme Court of Utah after this court affirmed 
appellant's convictions for the offenses of Possession of a Controlled Substance with 
Intent to Distribute, a Second Degree Felony; Possession of a Controlled Substance 
with Intent to Distribute, a Third Degree Felony; and Possession of Controlled 
Substance, a Third Degree Felony. 
1A copy of that order is attached in the Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR APPEAL 
Was there sufficient attenuation between the illegal roadblock stop and the 
voluntary consent to search the vehicle to relieve that consent of the taint from the 
initial stop? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States: 
The right to the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant was originally charged in a twelve count information alleging the 
commission of six felonies and six misdemeanors. (R. 3). Ultimately, appellant was 
tried on a three count amended information alleging two counts of Possession of a 
Controlled substance with Intent to Distribute (methaimphetamine and marijuana) and 
one count of Possession of a Controlled Substance (cocaine). (R. 150-151). Prior to 
trial, appellant and his co-defendant made motions to suppress evidence. (R. 26-29). 
It was alleged that the evidence was seized in violation of Article I, Section 14 of the 
Constitution of Utah and the fourth and fourteenth amendments to the United States 
Constitution. (R. 88-131). Those motions were denied after a hearing at which 
2 
evidence was submitted on the preliminary hearing transcript. (R. 87). Evidence was 
also taken by the court at that hearing to supplement that transcript. (Tr.M.S. 1-
33).2 In a written order, the motion to suppress was denied. (R. 68-71 ).3 Appellant 
was tried and convicted by a jury. (R. 195). 
An appeal was taken to this court. The judgement and convictions rendered 
against appellant were affirmed in an unpublished opinion.4 In doing so this court 
found that the roadblock stop of the vehicle which appellant was driving violated the 
fourth amendment. However, this court ruled that there was a voluntary consent to 
the search of the vehicle. Counsel for appellant in that initial appeal failed to raise the 
issue of the attenuation between the illegal stop and the voluntary consent. 
Therefore, this court held that the voluntary consent governed the admissibility of the 
evidence. The codefendant did raise the attenuation issue in his brief before this 
court. His conviction was reversed. State v. Small. 829 P.2d 129 (Utah App. 
1992).5 Appellant filed a petition for certiorari in the Utah Supreme Court. It alleged 
that the appellant was denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel 
in his original appeal before this court and that this court committed plain error in 
refusing to address the attenuation issue. A motion for summary disposition was filed 
2The Transcript of the motion to suppress hearing is designated T r M.S." 
3A copy of that ruling is attached in the Addendum. 
4A copy of that opinion is attached in the Addendum. 
5A copy of that opinion is attached in the Addendum. 
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in the supreme court. The state conceded that appellant had been denied effective 
assistance of counsel on appeal. The supreme court reversed the judgement of this 
court and ordered that the attenuation issue be briefed by counsel and addressed by 
this court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On September 29, 1988, law enforcement officers established a roadblock on 
the south Fillmore interchange of Interstate 15 in Millard County, Utah (R. 87, p.6). 
That roadblock was found by this court to violate the fourth amendment. State v. 
Small, supra.6 At about 11:30 a.m. on September 19, 1988, officers at that 
roadblock stopped a vehicle driven by the appellant. (R. 87, p.7). The codefendant, 
Lemuel Small, was seated in the front passenger seat of the vehicle. (R. 87 p.8). 
Deputy Millard County Sheriff, Jeff Whatcott, requested the vehicle registration and 
license from the appellant. (R. 87 p. 9). Appellant produced a driver's license and 
Small produced the registration. (R. 87, p. 8-9). The vehicle was registered to 
Russell Clarence. (R. 87 p. 9). Small indicated that the vehicle belonged to a friend. 
(R. 87 p. 9). Small was requested to produce identification. (R. 87 p. 9). As he 
pulled out his wallet, Deputy Whatcott observed Small shove a clear ziplock plastic 
bag between the seats. (R. 87, p. 9-10). The deputy then questioned the two about 
where they had been (R. 87, p. 10), and if they possessed any alcohol, firearms or 
controlled substances. (R. 87, p. 11-12). Appellant and Small indicated that they had 
6See also the unpublished opinion of this court in appellant's original appeal. 
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been to Las Vegas (R. 87, p. 10) and were not in possession of any of the contraband 
listed by the deputy. (R. 87, p. 11-12). 
Deputy Whatcott then requested to search the vehicle. (R. 87, p. 12). The 
occupants acquiesced to that request. (R. 87, p. 12). Appellant exited the vehicle 
and a loaded firearm was located under the driver's seat. (R. 87, p. 12). He then 
asked Small if there were other firearms located in the vehicle. (R. 87, p. 13-14). 
Small produced two loaded revolvers. Small and appellant were placed under arrest. 
(R. 87, p. 24). A further search of the vehicle resulted in the discovery of another 
firearm (R. 87, p. 28), eight ounces of methamphetamine, (R. 87, p.22), six pounds 
fourteen ounces of marijuana, (R. 87, p. 25-26), a small quantity of cocaine (R. 87, 
p. 26-27) and three thousand seven hundred fifty dollars in currency. (R. 87, p.23). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
There was insufficient attenuation between the illegal stop and the voluntary 
consent to alleviate the consent from the taint of the illegal stop. The stop and 
consent were closely related in time, there were no intervening circumstances and the 
police conduct constituted a purposeful and flagrant fourth amendment violation. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The trial court's factual findings are to be reviewed under a clearly erroneous 
standard and the ultimate conclusion that any consent was or was not obtained as a 
result of prior illegal police conduct is reviewed for correctness. State v. Thurman. 
_ P . 2 d _ , 203 U.A.R. 18 (Utah 1993). When no findings have been entered and 
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there are no contested facts, this court may determine the attenuation issue without 
a remand for factual findings, State v. Small, supra, State v. Costner. 825 P.2d 699 
(Utah App. 1992). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
ANY CONSENT GIVEN TO SEARCH THE VEHICLE LACKED 
ATTENUATION FROM THE INITIAL ILLEGAL STOP, 
MAKING THE EVIDENCE SEIZED INADMISSABLE. 
In ruling on the suppression motion in this case, the trial court held that the 
roadblock in question did not violate the fourth amendment and that the defendants 
consented to the search of the vehicle. (R. 68-71). At the time that the that motion 
was filed and decided, the rule in Utah was that a voluntary consent purged the taint 
of a prior illegal stop. State v. Arrovo, 770 P.2d 153 (Utah App. 1989); State v. 
Sierra. 754 P.2d 972 (Utah App. 1988). 
The Supreme Court of Utah reversed those rulings. The court held that for 
evidence to be admissible as a result of a consent to search, the consent must be 
both voluntary and it must be attenuated from any prior illegal search. State v. 
Arrovo. 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990) State v. Thurman. supra. In this case, appellant 
did not raise the attenuation argument in the trial court. However, since such a 
position was not available at the time the motion was heard, this argument may now 
be raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Sims. 808 P,2d 141 (Utah App. 1991). 
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Furthermore, trial counsel moved to suppress all of the "fruits" of the initial illegal 
search. (R. 26-29). Under the Arrovo attenuation analysis the consent is the fruit of 
the illegal stop. To determine if a voluntary consent is sufficiently attenuated from 
a prior illegal stop or search, an analysis of three factors that were initially described 
in Brown v. Illinois. 422 U.S. 590 (1975), is required. Those factors include: the 
temporal proximity of the primary illegality and the granting of consent, the presence 
or absence of intervening circumstances, and the purpose and flagrancy of the illegal 
police conduct. 
In State v. Thurman. supra, the court indicated that the analysis of the 
attenuation between an illegal stop and a voluntary consent should be done in light 
of the deterrent purpose of the fourth amendment exclusionary rule. The court went 
on to note that the purpose in the attenuation analysis is to determine the point at 
which the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule no longer justifies its cost. The 
cost that the court was describing related to society's interest in providing all relevant 
evidence to the jury so that it may properly exercise its fact finding function. The 
analysis employed by the court in Thurman does not change the existing law relating 
to the attenuation analysis as it requires consideration of the same factors that this 
court previously required.7 
7See generally: State v. Sims, supra; State v. Costner. supra; State v. Carter, 808 
P.2d 736 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Robinson. 797 P.2d 431 (Utah App. 1990); 
State v. Godina-Luna. 826 P.2d 652 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Lovearen. 829 P.2d 
155 (Utah App. 1992). 
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In Thurman the officers executed a search warrant in relation to a homicide 
investigation. A "no knock" provision had not been authorized by the federal 
magistrate who issued the warrant. The officers served the warrant shortly after 6:00 
a.m. The officers waited less than 30 seconds after knocking on the defendant's 
door. The defendant was rousted from bed and handcuffed without being allowed to 
dress. During the course of the handcuffing the defendant's nose was bloodied. He 
than was given a Miranda warning and signed two consent forms. He had been 
handcuffed and detained for a period of about five hours. He was given another 
Miranda warning and signed a second consent to search form for the same storage 
unit that he had previously consented to be searched. At the storage unit the 
defendant unlocked the door and allowed the police to enter it after he was 
unhandcuffed. The court assumed for purposes of the appeal that the violation of the 
"no knock" provision of the warrant also violated the fourth amendment.8 
With respect to the purpose and flagrancy of the police conduct in Thurman. 
the court noted that the entry appeared to have been intentional and was calculated 
to surprise, confuse and possibly frighten the defendant. The court weighed those 
factors against the fact that the officers did have a search warrant. The existence of 
that warrant was of critical importance as its lawful execution would have resulted 
in the discovery of the storage unit. The officers indicated that their primary concern 
8That assumption is inconsistent with the court's recent ruling in State v. Rowe. 
P.2d , 196 U.A.R. 14 (Utah 1992). 
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in making the entry was for their own safety. In addition to the fact that the officers 
were executing a lawful order, the court held that the five hour lapse of time, 
providing of Miranda warnings and signing of the consent forms weighed against the 
defendant. That resulted in the conclusion that the deterrent value in suppressing the 
evidence was minimal. Consequently, the trial court's denial of the motion to 
suppress was affirmed. 
The facts in this case are distinguishable from Thurman. The roadblock was 
established without statutory on judicial authorization.9 The stop of appellant was 
intentional and its purpose was to discover evidence of any criminal violation. The 
consent was received almost immediately after the stop. There were no intervening 
circumstances such as signing of consent forms or providing Miranda warnings. This 
court in State v. Small, supra, stated that the facts and circumstances of this 
roadblock stop were indistinguishable form State v. Sims, supra. In doing so the court 
held that there was insufficient attenuation between the illegal stop and the voluntary 
consent to alleviate the taint of the illegal stop. Since Small involved the same stop 
as the instant case the principle of stare decisis should govern and the evidence 
should be ordered suppressed. 
The court in Sims addressed the issue of temporal proximity and found that a 
very short time had passed between the initial stop and the voluntary of consent. The 
highway patrol trooper in Sims had requested them inspected the defendant's driver's 
9See: State v. Sims, supra. 
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license and vehicle registration. He had questioned Sims about where he had been 
and where he was going. The trooper then asked about the presence of alcohol, 
firearms and narcotics in the vehicle. During the conversation, the trooper had 
observed a partially full liquor bottle on the back seat of the vehicle. After the 
conversation, the trooper requested them obtained the defendant's consent to search. 
With respect to the issue of temporal proximity, the only difference between 
this case and Sims is that the deputy in the instant case observed a ziplock baggie 
rather than a open liquor bottle. The deputy in this case requested the registration 
and driver's licenses of the occupants. He engaged in exactly the same questioning 
as was done in Sims. Within an extremely short period of time, the occupants of the 
vehicle acceded to the officer's request to search. 
As to the question of intervening factors, the court in Sims held that such 
circumstances must be independent of the illegality. The court noted that there was 
nothing in the encounter that would allow the defendant to believe that the was free 
to leave after the initial stop at the roadblock. The consent was obtained as a result 
of an unbroken chain of events beginning with the initial illegal stop. This case also 
involved an unbroken chain of events between the stop and the grant of consent. 
Those events, likewise included a request from the deputy for the consent to search 
the vehicle. 
With respect to the final factor to be considered, the court in Sims found that 
one of the purposes of the roadblock, drug interdiction, was a valid consideration but 
10 
was pursued by unauthorized means. The court held that officers involved in 
conducting the roadblock, including some of the same officers as are involved in the 
instant case, were experienced offers who would be properly charged with the 
awareness that their conduct was not authorized by law. The court also noted that 
using ten to twelve local officers to staff a roadblock in a rural county may have left 
other parts of that jurisdiction with delayed police assistance in the event of need. 
The roadblock in this case was likewise established in a rural county. Finally, the 
stated purpose of the roadblock-license, registration and safety checks-appeared to 
be a ruse to make observations and obtain evidence from drivers that could not be 
obtained without violating the fourth amendment. 
The roadblock stop in this case was closely related in time to the consent to 
search. The consent was the result of an unbroken chain of events that began with 
the roadblock stop. Finally, there is nothing in the purpose or nature of the roadblock 
that would relieve the taint from the prior illegal stop. In fact, the stop was 
intentional and purposeful. Consequently, the consent to search was not sufficiently 
attenuated from the initial illegal stop to make the evidence admissible. 
The evidence seized as a result of the illegal roadblock stop of the vehicle which 
appellant was driving must be ordered suppressed. The court below committed error 
by allowing that evidence to be admitted at trial. The evidence establishing the three 
offenses for which appellant was convicted was that same evidence which is subject 
11 
to suppression. Consequently, the failure of the trial court to order the evidence to 
be suppressed was prejudicial error. 
CONCLUSION 
The roadblock stop of the vehicle in which appellant was riding violated the 
fourth amendment to the United States Constitution. Any consent to search the 
vehicle was not sufficiently attenuated from that stop to make the evidence 
admissible. The evidence seized as a result of the search of that vehicle should be 
ordered suppressed. Since the admission of that evidence at trial was prejudicial, this 
court should further order a new trial where the inadmissible evidence will not be 
introduced. 
DATED this day of September, 1993. 
STEPHEN R. McCAUGHEY 
Attorney for Appellant 
G. FRED METOS 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed/hand delivered 
on this day of January, 1993, to: 
JAN GRAHAM 
Utah Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
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ADDENDUM 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Dennis Shoulderblade, 
Defendant and Petitioner, 
Supreme Court No. 92 02 3 9 
ORDER 
Defendant's motion to summarily reverse the Court of 
Appeal's decision in this case is granted, and the case is 
remanded to that court for further proceedings. 
The Court of Appeals is directed to invite the 
parties to brief the issue of whether there was sufficient 
attenuation between the illegal roadblock stop and a 
voluntary consent to search, so as to preclude the 
application of the fourth amendment exclusionary rule, and to 
issue its ruling on the attenuation question. 
Dated this fifth day of January, 1993. 
BY THE COURT 
Gordon R. Hall 
Chief Justice 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
******* 
\TE OF UTAH, ) Case Number 88-2413 
Plaintiff, ) 
) RULING 





This matter came before the Court on the 4th day of 
just, 1989 on defendant's motion to suppress. The parties 
offered certain testimony, a witness was called and testified, 
I counsel presented their arguments to the Court. The Court, 
ing taken the matter under advisement, and having diligently 
isidered all of the evidence before it, now enters this: 
RULING 
On September 29, 1988, the Utah Highway Patrol, in 
junction with the Millard County Sheriff's Office conducted a 
dblock on a flat section of Interstate Highway 15, south of 
lfnore. Notice of the checkpoint was duly given one week 
ore in the local newspaper of general circulation. Prior to 
ting the roadblock, the officers were briefed and instructed 
check for proper driver's license and vehicle registration, 
ropriate signs were placed, announcing the checkpoint at some 
During the roadblock, all cars were stopped. Pursuant 
o the roadblock, defendants were stopped. During the stop, the 
officer present observed defendant Small shove a plastic bag 
•etween the front seats of the car. The officer checked both 
lefendants1 identification and determined that the car was not 
egistered to either defendant. While awaiting confirmation from 
ispatch regarding registration, the officer asked defendants 
hether there were any firearms, alcohol, or drugs in the car. 
'he response was in the negative. The officer then requested 
ermission to search the vehicle. Consent was given. 
As defendant Shoulderblade exited the car, the officer 
oticed a gun under the front seat. Subsequent search of the 
•assenger compartment of the vehicle revealed a substantial 
[uantity of drugs, drug paraphernalia, money, and loaded 
irearms. In the course of the search of the passenger 
ompartment, the officer asked defendants if they knew anything 
bout the firearms or the drugs. Defendants responded in the 
legative. They were subsequently arrested and were apprised of 
heir rights before any further attempt at questioning-
As the officer searched the passenger compartment of 
he vehicle, he smelled what he believed to be raw marihuana. He 
;ubsequently, opened *€he trunk and found more drugs and 
paraphernalia. 
The evidence presented indicates that the roadblock was 
>roperly instituted at a fixed point as indicated in Delaware v. 
» _ ^ A A f\ f l <"* HAG £L*L A / 1 0 - 7 0 \ T»U~ ^U ^ ^ U ~ ~ C ~ * - . 1 ~ > 4- ^ J3 Z~ 
flat area and was highly visible. By allowing officers to 
*ck licenses and vehicle registration, advanced a legitimate 
fernmental purpose as required in United States v. McFayden, 
i F.2d 1306 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
As further required in McFayden, there was no 
jcretion on the part of officers stopping the cars—all were 
juired to stop. While there is some question as to whether all 
the large trucks were stopped at the roadblock, there was no 
*ar testimony that they were not stopped. The court notes that 
* Tenth Circuit has ruled that letting certain vehicles through 
* roadblock unchecked is notr per se, an unlawful practice. 
Lted States v. Corral, 823 F.2d 1389 (10th Cir. 1987). In any 
*nt, it is undisputed that all passenger vehicles were stopped. 
Questioning as part of an initial stop does not 
rmally rise to the level of a custodial interrogation. The 
ah Supreme Court has held that Miranda warnings are not 
quired for investigation and interview pursuant to determining 
sther a crime has been committed. Salt Lake City v. Carner, 
4 P.2d 1168, 1170 (Utah 1983). 
The factors required for a Miranda warning under Carner 
e not present. Here questioning as to the contents of the car 
&»a;made as the officer awaited information from the dispatcher 
latsLve to vehicle registration. Questioning made during the 
ar<2h of the vehicle was not accusatory. Any interrogation if 
can be called that was brief and informal. See Carner, at 
71. Thp dpfpndants were onlv rif*t^inp»r* aftpr f^r-t^ r-^ mo Yn 
ght during the check that created a reasonable suspicion, that 
e occupants were engaged in some criminal activity (Carner). 
e uncontroverted testimony is that the defendants were properly 
vised of their rights before further attempts at questioning. 
All of the above factors: notice of the stop# its 
cation, legitimate purpose of the stop, training of the 
ficers, the minimal intrusion by the officers unless there was 
articulateble and reasonable suspicion, establish a minimum 
public inconvenience. 
Defendants gave permission to search the vehicle, 
isent was never withdrawn. As such, the subsequent search of 
e trunk was reasonable and proper. Even if the consent was 
mehow defective, (and there is no evidence that this is the 
se) this court believes that due to the evidence found in the 
ssenger compartment and the smell of marijuana, the officer had 
Dbable cause to search the trunk space. See State v. Earl, 716 
2d 803 (Utah 1986). 
Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that the 
nicle stop, search, and subsequent arrest were properly 
ninistered. The Court therefore denies defendants' motion to 
Dpress. 
DATED at Provo, Ut&|f this *2~- f day of August, 1989. 
: Dexter Anderson 
Milton Harmon 
F1LHD 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Dennis Shoulderblade, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
MAR 121992 
*^Jary T. Noonan 
Clerk <* tne Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Publication) 
Case No. 900288-CA 
F I L E D 
(March 1 2 , 1992) 
Fourth District, Millard County 
The Honorable George E. Ballif 
Attorneys: Milton T. Harmon, Nephi, for Appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam, Marian Decker, and David B. 
Thompson, Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Billings, Jackson, and Russon. 
JACKSON, Judge: 
This is an appeal from a trial courts denial of appellant 
Dennis Shoulderblade's motion to suppress certain evidence that 
was obtained as a result of a roadblock and subsequent search of 
the vehicle he was driving. We affirm. 
Shoulderblade has not challenged the trial court's findings 
of fact on appeal. Therefore, we adopt the following facts. 
On September 29, 1988, the Utah Highway Patrol, in conjunction 
with the Millard County Sheriff's office, conducted a roadblock 
in Millard County, Utah, on a section of Interstate 15. 
Approximately fifteen officers were assigned to operate the 
roadblock. They were instructed to check for driver's licenses 
and vehicle registration. In addition, the officers were told to 
further question anyone who looked suspicious. 
During the roadblock, all vehicles were stopped, including 
the vehicle Shoulderblade was driving. Lemuel Small was a 
passenger in that vehicle. Officer Jeffrey Whatcott, who 
executed the stop, testified that both Small and Shoulderblade 
produced valid identification. The vehicle was not registered to 
either Small or Shoulderblade. Small told the officer that the 
vehicle belonged to a friend of his. The officer sought 
confirmation of registration through radio dispatch. He also 
asked Small and Shoulderblade if there were any firearms, 
alcohol, or drugs in the vehicle. Both replied in the negative. 
Officer Whatcott then requested permission to search the vehicle. 
Small consented. Both Small and Shoulderblade were arrested 
after a substantial quantity of drugs, drug paraphernalia, 
firearms, and cash was found in the vehicle. Officer Whatcott 
continued to search the vehicle, and upon smelling marijuana, 
opened the trunk of the vehicle and discovered more drugs and 
paraphernalia. 
Small and Shoulderblade were charged in an amended 
information with several counts of possession of controlled 
substances. Both defendants filed motions to suppress the 
evidence that was found in the vehicle. The motions were based 
on the alleged illegality of the roadblock. The trial court 
concluded that the roadblock was instituted in a lawful manner. 
The court further held that Miranda warnings were not required 
under the facts before it, and that any interrogation that took 
place was brief and informal. The uncontroverted testimony 
indicated that both Small and Shoulderblade were properly advised 
of their rights before further attempts at questioning them took 
place. 
The trial court made the following findings: Small and 
Shoulderblade consented to the search of the vehicle; the consent 
was never withdrawn; even if the consent were found to be somehow 
defective, there was probable cause to search the trunk of the 
vehicle. Based on the foregoing, the court denied the motions to 
suppress• 
Small and Shoulderblade were tried by a jury on February 16, 
1990. The jury convicted Small of one count of possession of a 
controlled substance (cocaine), a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1988), and 
two counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent to 
distribute (methamphetamine and marijuana), a second and a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) 
(Supp. 1988).l Shoulderblade appeals the trial court's denial of 
his motion to suppress the evidence found as a result of the 
search. 
Shoulderblade first asserts that the roadblock at which he 
was stopped violated his constitutional right against 
1. The current versions of the statutes under which Shoulderblade 
was convicted tt€ Modified at Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (Supp. 
1992). 
unreasonable searches and seizures. The State concedes that the 
roadblock in question does not pass muster under the federal 
constitution, and therefore we reverse the trial court's 
determination that the roadblock was conducted in a legal manner. 
Shoulderblade did not argue before the trial court, or 
before this court, that the consent given to search the vehicle 
was involuntary, or that it was insufficiently attenuated from 
the illegal roadblock to justify the search. As the State points 
out, while a nonattenuation argument was unavailable to 
Shoulderblade in the trial court, because, as acknowledged in 
State v. Sims. 808 P.2d 141, 150 (Utah App. 1991), cert, pending, 
"then-standing decisions effectively held that a non-coerced 
search consent, by itself, purged the taint of a primary 
illegality," id. at 150, the argument was available when this 
case was briefed for appeal. However, Shoulderblade has failed 
to articulate such an argument before this court. 
Therefore, in light of the trial court's uncontested finding 
that consent was given to search the vehicle, we affirm the trial 
court's denial of Shoulderblade's motion to suppress on the 
ground that the challenged evidence was obtained during a valid 
consent search.2 
Norman H. J a c k s o q ^ O u d g e 
WE CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
Leonard H. Russon, Judge 
2. Shoulderblade also asserts because the evidence was seized as 
a result of interrogations which violated his right against self-
incrimination , the evidence is inadmissible. Nothing in his 
statement of facts, however, comes close to describing any 
interrogation that might have taken place, or what, if any 
incriminating statements were obtained therefrom. Further, 
the. trial court found that the questioning that took place during 
the search of the vehicle.was "not accusatory," and that the 
uncontroverted testimony ~ir*iicated that Shoulderblade was advised 
of his constitutional rights following his arrest. Shoulderblade 
has not cited us to anywhere in the record that disputes this 
finding. 
"*•* GLSLJ 
This opinion is subject to revision before ^ •- -•flR \ 9 1992 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. sC/t^js^/fru 
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JACKSON, Judge: 
This is an appeal from a trial court's denial of appellant 
Lemuel T. Small's motion to suppress evidence obtained as a 
result of a roadblock and subsequent search of the vehicle in 
which Small was a passenger. We reverse and remand for a new 
trial in which the evidence seized from the vehicle is to be 
suppressed. 
FACTS 
Small does not challenge the trial court's findings of fact. 
Therefore, for purposes of this appeal the facts are as follows. 
On September 29, 1988, the Utah Highway Patrol, in 
conjunction with the Millard County Sheriff's office, conducted a 
roadblock in Millard County, Utah, on a section of Interstate 15. 
Notice of the roadblock was published in the Millard County 
Chronicle one week before the roadblock was instituted and signs 
were placed on the freeway, warning drivers that they would have 
to stop. Approximately fifteen officers were assigned to operate 
the upadblock. They were instructed to ciheck for drivers' 
liQ€g£es and vehicle registration. In addition, the officers 
were told to further question anyone who looked suspicious. 
During the roadblock, all vehicles were stopped, including 
the vehicle in which Small was a passenger. The vehicle was 
driven by Dennis Shoulderblade. Officer Jeffrey Whatcott, who 
executed the stop, testified that both Small and Shoulderblade 
produced valid identification. The vehicle was not registered to 
either Small or Shoulderblcide. Small told the officer that the 
vehicle belonged to a friend of his. Officer Whatcott sought 
confirmation of registration through radio dispatch. He also 
asked Small and Shoulderblcide if there were any firearms, 
alcohol, or drugs in the V€»hicle. Both replied in the negative. 
Officer Whatcott requested permission to search the vehicle, and 
Small consented. 
In searching the vehicle, Officer Whatcott located a 
substantial quantity of drugs, drug paraphernalia, firearms, and 
cash. Both Small and Shoulderblade were cirrested. Officer 
Whatcott continued to search the vehicle, and upon smelling 
marijuana, opened the trunk of the vehicle* and discovered more 
drugs and paraphernalia. 
In an amended information, Small and Shoulderblade were 
charged with several counts of possession of controlled 
substances. Both defendants filed motions to suppress the 
evidence that was found in the vehicle. The motions were based 
on the alleged illegality of the roadblock. The trial court 
concluded that the roadblock was instituted in a lawful manner. 
The trial court also found that Small and Shoulderblade consented 
to the search of the vehicle, and that the consent was never 
withdrawn. Based on the foregoing, the court denied the motions 
to suppress. 
Small and Shoulderblade were tried by a jury on February 16, 
1990. The jury convicted Small of one count of possession of a 
controlled substance (cocaine), a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1988), and 
two counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent to 
distribute (methamphetamine and marijuana), a second and a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) 
(Supp. 1988).* 
1. The current versions of the statutes under which Small was 
convicted are codified at Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (Supp. 1992). 
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ISSUES 
Small appeals the denial of his motion to suppress, 
contending that (1) the roadblock stop of the vehicle in which he 
was riding was illegal; and (2) because there was insufficient 
attenuation between the illegal roadblock and any consent given, 
all evidence discovered subsequent to the roadblock stop should 
have been suppressed by the trial court. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In reviewing a challenge to a lower court's suppression 
ruling, we will not reverse the findings of fact underlying that 
ruling unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. Palmer, 803 
P.2d 1249, 1251 (Utah App. 1990Wcert. denied, 802 P.2d 748 
(Utah 1991). Those factual findings are clearly erroneous only 
if they are against the clear weight of the evidence. State v. 
Castner. 179 Utah Adv. Rep. 11, 12 (Utah App. 1992); State v. 
Leonard, 175 Utah Adv. Rep. 49, 50 (Utah App. 1991). The issue 
of the constitutionality of a roadblock stop is a matter of law 
which we review with no particular deference to the trial court's 
conclusions. State v. Sims, 808 P.2d 141, 144 (Utah App. 1991), 
cert, pending. 
LEGALITY OF THE ROADBLOCK 
Small asserts that the roadblock at which he was stopped 
violated his constitutional right against unreasonable searches 
and seizures. Specifically, Small alleges that the roadblock did 
not meet the objective standards required by the Fourth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of 
the Utah Constitution. 
At the time of its denial of Small's motion to suppress, the 
trial court did not have the benefit of the United States Supreme 
Court's decision in Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz. 496 
U.S. 444, 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990). The State concedes that the 
roadblock in the present case fails to meet the requirements for 
roadblocks set out in Sitz. We agree. Thus, the roadblock stop 
violated Small's Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable 
seizures, and the trial court's conclusion to the contrary is 
reversed.2 
2. Because the roadblock does not pass muster under the federal 
constitution, we need not consider its validity under the state 
constitution. See State v. Park. 810 P.2d 456, 458 n.l (Utah 
App.), cert, denied. 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991). 
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ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE FOLLOWING ILLEGAL ROADBLOCK 
Having determined that the roadblock stop of the vehicle was 
unconstitutional, we must now determine if the subsequent 
warrantless search was nevertheless valid. Relying on State v. 
Sims. 808 P.2d 141 (Utah App. 1991), cert, pending. Small 
asserts that while he consented to the search of the vehicle, his 
consent was obtained as a result of an unbroken chain of events 
that began with the illegal roadblock, and that as a result, his 
consent is not valid. 
The State has the burden of establishing that the evidence 
obtained following the illegal roadblock was not tainted by 
showing the consent given was sufficiently attenuated from that 
illegality. See Sims, 808 P.2d at 151. 
Two factors determine whether consent to 
a search is lawfully obtained following 
initial police misconduct. The inquiry 
should focus on whether the consent was 
voluntary and whether the consent was 
obtained by police exploitation of the prior 
illegality. Evidence obtained in searches 
following police illegality must meet both 
tests to be admissible. 
State v. Arrovo, 796 P.2d 684, 688 (Utah 1990) (citing 3 W. 
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.2(d), at 190 (2d ed. 1987)). The 
State argues that because the trial court did not make explicit 
findings on either prong of the Arroyo test, we should remand for 
the trial court to make detailed findings to support the consent 
determination. We decline the State7s invitation to remand for 
further findings3 because, as this court stated in State v. 
Castner, 179 Utah Adv. Rep. 11, 14 & n.3 (Utah App. 1992), when 
the record at the suppression hearing is sufficiently detailed 
and there are no contested facts, we are in as good a position as 
the trial court to decide the taintedness/attenuation issue. 
3. We acknowledge that fact-sensitive issues such as consent are 
best resolved by the trial court. However, in this case counsel 
for both Small and for the State indicated at oral argument that 
there were no facts in dispute and it was doubtful that any 
further enlightening facts"would be forthcoming. 
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A. Voluntary Consent 
Voluntariness of consent is a fact sensitive question and we 
look to the totality of circumstances to ascertain if there is 
clear and positive testimony that the consent was unequivocal and 
freely given. Castner, 179 Utah Adv. Rep. at 13; Carter. 812 
P.2d at 467; State v. Grovier, 808 P.2d 133, 136 (Utah App. 
1991); State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 887-88 (Utah App.), cert, 
denied. 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990). The trial court determined 
that Small had consented to the searches. Small does not 
challenge that ruling on appeal. However, the trial court did 
not address whether or not the consent was voluntary. This is an 
important first prong in the Arroyo analysis. We find nothing in 
the undisputed facts that suggests Small's consent v/as not 
voluntary. 
B. Dissipation of Taint 
The conclusion that there was voluntary consent does not end 
our inquiry as we must also determine if the consent was 
untainted by the prior illegality. Castner, 179 Utah Adv. Rep. 
at 14. "We examine several factors to determine if there has 
been an exploitation of a prior illegality: temporal proximity 
of the illegality and the evidence sought to be suppressed, the 
presence of intervening factors, and the purpose and flagrancy of 
the misconduct." Id.; accord Sims, 808 P.2d at 150; Arroyo, 796 
P.2d at 690-91 n.4. 
This case is indistinguishable from Sims. The record 
demonstrates a very short period of time elapsed between Small's 
stop at the roadblock and Officer Whatcott's request to search. 
As for intervening factors, none exist. The consent was obtained 
during the ongoing illegal roadblock stop. On the uncontroverted 
facts before us, we conclude that Small's consent to have the 
vehicle searched was not sufficiently attenuated to dissipate the 
taint of the illegal roadblock. 
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CONCLUSION 
Small's convictions are reyersed and the case is remanded to 
the trial court for proceedings in accord with this opinion. 
Norman H. Jackson,*uudge 
WE CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
Leonard H. Russon, Judge 
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